Themes in Hip Hop Culture Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Themes in Hip Hop Culture - Essay Example In tandem with the salient issues and themes touched upon by the textual sources under consideration, the movie Boyz n the Hood does bring to fore many political, social and cultural issues that are conveniently bypassed by the popular media and cinema.The Hip Hop culture evident in the movie does intertwine with the glaring political and social issues like economic and social marginalization and racism faced by the communities. The whole objective is to usher in a measure of education and concern through a medium that is highly creative, subtle and insightful. The gang violence covered by the movie and the salient social, familial and academic influences which on one side make Doughboy fall a victim to the vicious and unsparing gang violence and which on the other side does convince Tre to renounce a life of violence does show as to how the flares of hope do shimmer in an otherwise violent and crime ridden life in the hood. The book by Nelson George, Durand’s Lecture, the for ward in the Anthology of Rap, and discussions in the class do envelop this society altering collision between the salient and dominant culture that is pervasive and powerful and the marginalized black culture thriving in the hood.The movie Boyz n the Hood does represent an effective and moving outlet for an array of racial, cultural and political themes that are so strongly embraced and expressed by the larger Hip Hop culture. For instance in the climax of the movie where Doughboy gets dejected and disheartened by a life imbued with violence and revenge.

Physical Science Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words - 3

Physical Science - Essay Example This situation could be reversed and normal operation restored after diagnosing the problem. In this context, the portable room heater needs to have high resistance so as to be effective in emission of heat. As such, a high current would be required for this function. The high current demanded by the heater would cause a high flow of current in the electric connection in the room. The circuit breaker exposed to the high current would cause the metal strip in it to warm up and bend away, breaking the circuit connection in the room, breaking normal electric supply which causes the lights to go off. Similarly, the metal strip in the circuit breaker could be of too low resistance. As such, it fails to contain the flow of current required for normal operation of the room heater. As such, any slight rise in the current above what sustains lighting of the bulbs in the room would exceed its resistance threshold, warming up the metal strip causing it to bend away from the circuit and breaking the electric connection and the lights go

The Concept Of Governmentality

The Concept Of Governmentality The concept of governmentality is a neologism used by Michel Foucault in his work on modern forms of political power. It is a term that combines government and rationality, suggesting a form of political analysis that focuses on the forms of knowledge that make objects visible and available for governing. In Foucaults terms, governmentality refers to a distinctive modality for exercising power, one which is not reducible to the state. Governmentality is understood to work at a distance by seeking to shape the conduct of conduct. This in turn implies that governmentality refers to a wide range of points of application, including fields of action not ordinarily thought of as political, such as medicine, education, religion, or popular culture. Governmentality is a notion that develops Foucaults distinctive approach to the analysis of power relations. His work not only relocates power, dispersing it away from sovereign actions of centralised state agencies. It rethinks the type of action through which power is exercised (see Brown 2006b). In fundamental respects, the significance of the notion of governmentality for social theory turns on the interpretation of just what sort of theory of action this notion presupposes. The next two sections explore just where this significance lies. Lemke (2002) argues that Foucaults work on governmentality provides a means of understanding the relationships between knowledge, strategies of power and technologies of the self that can usefully augment narratives of neoliberalism. From this perspective, neoliberalism is understood as a political rationality that tries to render the social domain economic and to link a reduction in (welfare) state services and security systems to the increasing call for personal responsibility and self-care' (Lemke 2001, 203). On this understanding, governmentality is a concept that augments the political-economy approaches outlined in the previous section. For example, Ongs (1999) account of the distinctive forms of governmentality deployed by post-developmental states revolves around the assumption that various regulatory regimes manipulate cultural discourses to selectively make people into certain sorts of economic subjects consistent with the objectives of particular national strategies of acc umulation. Jessop (2007, 40) has also argued that the convergence between Marxism and governmentality studies follows from the mutually supportive emphases of the two approaches: while Marx seeks to explain the why of capital accumulation and state power, Foucaults analyses of disciplinarity and governmentality try to explain the how of economic exploitation and political domination. This formulation acknowledges Foucaults own observation that he was concerned with the how of power, but assumes that this descriptive focus merely augments the explanatory project of Marxist political-economy. What is covered over here is a fundamental philosophical difference between these two approaches: the concept of governmentality implies an analysis that focuses on the description of practices instead of causes and explanations. The Marxist and Foucauldian approaches are not necessarily as easily reconciled as it might appear. There are two main areas of difference between these approaches: their respective understandings of the state and of discourse (Traub-Werner 2007, 1444-1446). Political-economy approaches assume fairly static models of the state and the market, and view their relationship in terms of contradictory movements of de-regulation and re-regulation; they also assume that discourse is a representational concept, and focus upon how discourses are theorized differentially materialised in particular contexts. In contrast, governmentality refers to modalities of power that stretch far beyond the state; and discourse is not a representational system so much as a distinctive concept of action, referring to the combination of technologies, means of representation and fields of possibility. Despite the underlying philosophical differences between governmentality and Marxist political economy, Foucaults notion has become an important reference point in recent debates about neoliberalization (Larner 2003, Barnett 2005). If there is such a thing as a neoliberal project, then it is assumed that it must work by seeking to bring into existence lots of neoliberal subjects (cf. Barnett et al 2008). Work on this topic assumes that extending the range of activities that are commodified, commercialized and marketized necessarily implies that peoples subjectivities need to be re-tooled and re-worked as active consumers, entrepreneurial subjects, or empowered participants (e.g. Bondi 2005, GÃ ¶kariksel and Mitchell 2005, Mitchell 2003, Mitchell 2006, Sparke 2006a, Walkerdine 2005). In this interpretation, the dispersal of power implied by the notion of governmentality is re-centred around a sovereign conception of state action, now able to reach out all the more effectively into a ll sorts of arenas in order to secure the conditions of its own (il)legitimacy. The reduction of governmentality to a mechanism of subjectification marks the point at which Foucaults historical, genealogical approach to issues of subject formation is subordinated to presentist functionalism of theories of neoliberalization. This reduction follows from the ambivalence around subject-formation in the formalized models of governmentality that have developed Foucaults ideas. Roses (1999) analysis of advanced liberal governmentality argues that forms of social government, of which the classical Keynsian welfare state stands as the exemplar, are being supplanted by the de-socialisation of modes of governing. The rationalities of advanced liberal welfare reform take the ethical reconstruction of the welfare recipient as their central problem (ibid. 263). They seek to govern people by regulating the choices made by autonomous actors in the context of their everyday, ordinary commitments to friends, family and community. This rationality is visible in the proliferation o f the registers of empowerment and improvement, in which both subjects participating in welfare or development programmes are geared towards transforming the relationships that subjects have with themselves (Cruickshank 1999, Li 2007). In analyses of advanced liberal governmentality, these shifts in political rationality are the result of the efforts of a diverse set of actors pursuing plural ends. They do not reflect the aims of a singular, coherent neoliberal project pursued through the agency of the state. This emphasis is lost in the functionalist appropriation of governmentality to bolster theories of neoliberalization. This is compounded by the tendency in this work to presume that the description of political rationalities also describes the actual accomplishment of subject-effects. The vocabulary of theorists of neoliberal governmentality theorists is replete with terms such as elicit, promote, foster, attract, guide, encourage and so on: The key feature of the neo-liberal rationality is the congruence it endeavours to achieve between a responsible and moral individual and an economic-rational actor. It aspires to construct prudent subjects whose moral quality is based on the fact that they rationally assess the costs and benefits of a certain sort as opposed to other alternative acts (Lemke 2001, 201). The point to underscore here is the emphasis on a rationality that endeavours and aspires to bring about certain subject-effects. Narratives of the emergence of neoliberal governmentality display little sense of just whether and how governmental programmes seek to get people to comply with projects of rule or identify with subject-positions. This is in large part because the Foucauldian approach to neoliberalism continues to construe governmentality in terms of a politics of subjection (Clarke 2004d, 70-71). Such an assumption leads almost automatically to the conclusion that neoliberalism degrades any residual potential for public action inherent in liberal democracy (e.g. Brown 2003). Equipped with the concept of governmentality, this sort of presentation of neoliberalism is able to avoid any serious consideration of what sort of action can be exercised on subjects through acting on them at a distance. The idea that governmentality is a distinctive mode of political rule which seeks to hail into existence its preferred subjects, which are then only left with the option of resistance, needs to be treated with considerable scepticism. Understood as a mechanism of subjection, governmentality is assumed to work through the operation of norms. However, Foucauldian theory is chronically unable to acknowledge the work of communicative rationalities in making any action-through-norms possible (Hacking 2004). Theories of governmentality consistently fail to adequately specify the looping-effects between knowledge-technologies, practices, and subject-formation which are implied by the idea of governing at a distance (Barnett 2001). This failure leads to the supposition that governmentality works through representational modes of subjectification rather than through the practical ordering of fields of strategic and communicative action. At the very most, the governmentality approach implies a probabilistic relationship between regulatory rationalities of rule and the transformations of subjectivities, mediated by the rules of chance (Agrawal 2005, 161-163). It might even imply a reorientation of analysis towards understanding the assemblage of dispersed, singular acts rather than on psycho-social processes of individual subjection (Barnett et al 2008). The recuperation of governmentality as a theory of subject-formation, modelled on theories of interpellative hailing, overlooks the distinctive modality of action through which the Foucault addresses questions of subjectivity. Whereas liberalism and neoliberalism are understood in political-economy approaches as market ideologies, from the governmentality perspective liberalism (and by extension neoliberalism) should properly refer to a particular problematization of governing, and in particular the problematization of the task of governing free subjects. While a free market ideology might imply a problematization of free subjects, it does not follow that the problematization of free subjects is always and everywhere reducible to the imperatives of free market ideologies. Ong (2006) suggests, for example, a definition of neoliberalism in which long established technologies for administering subjects for self-mastery are only contingently articulated with projects directed at securing profitability. But this clarification still presumes that neoliberalism extends and reproduces itself primarily through a politics of subjection (see also Brown 2006a). It might be better to suppose that the distinctive focus in governmentality studies on modes of problematization should reorient analysis to the forms of what Foucault (1988) once called practices of ethical problematization. This would direct analytical attention to investigating the conditions for individuals to recognize themselves as particular kinds of persons and to reflect upon their conduct to problematize it such that they may work upon and transform themselves in certain ways and towards particular goals (Hodges 2002, 457). Two things follow from this reorientation. Firstly, it presumes that subjectivity is the product of situated rationalities of practice, rather than the representational medium of interpellative recognition (Hacking 2002). Secondly, it implies that the proposition that liberal governme ntality seeks to construct self-regulating subjectivities should not be too easily reduced to the proposition that these subjectivities are normatively self-interested egoists (Du Gay 2005). For example, Isin (2004) argues that the distinctive style of problematizing contemporary subjects of rule is in terms of so many neurotic subjects faced with various risks and hazards. One implication of this style of problematizing subjects is that state agencies continue to be the objects of demands to take responsibility for monitoring such neurotic subjects or securing them from harm. In this section we have seen how the third of the approaches to conceptualising neoliberalism identified by Larner (2000), which appeals to the concept of governmentality, can be more or less easily subsumed into the prevalent political-economy interpretation. The assumption that governmentality is a concept that refers to the inculcation of certain sorts of mentality into subjects is the prevalent interpretation of governmentality in geographys usage of this concept to bolster theories of neoliberalization, not least in the proliferation of work on neoliberal subjects. The marriage of political-economy and governmentality therefore generates a shared space of debate that defines state-of-the-art research into neoliberalization (Barnett 2005). While in the political-economy approach, discourses are treated as expressive of other levels of determination, in the governmentality approach political economic processes recede into the background; whereas political-economy approaches privil ege class relations over other social relations, the governmentality approach reduces the social field to a plane of subjectification. But these differences converge around a shared assumption that reproduction happens: that subjects live out their self-governing subjection as ascribed by governmental rationalities, or subordinate classes live out their regulatory roles as ascribed by hegemonic projects of consent (Clarke 2004c). And so it is that the social is reduced to the repository of a mysterious force of resistance waiting to be activated by the revelatory force of academic demystification. Foucauldian analysis of neoliberal governmentality remains unclear whether either tradition can provide adequate resources for thinking about the practical problems of democracy, rights and social justice. This is not helped by the systematic denigration in both lines of thought of liberalism, a catch-all term used with little discrimination

General Will and Rousseaus Social Contract :: Papers Politics Rousseau

When Jean Jacques Rousseau wrote the Social Contract, the concepts of liberty and freedom were not new ideas. Many political theorists such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke had already developed their own interpretations of liberty, and in fact Locke had already published his views on the social contract. What Rousseau did was to revolutionize the concepts encompassed by such weighty words, and introduce us to another approach to the social contract dilemma. What would bring man to leave the state of nature, and enter into an organized society? Liberals believed it was the guarantee of protection - liberty to them signified being free from harm towards one’s property. Rousseau’s notion of freedom was completely different than that of traditional liberals. To him, liberty meant a voice, and participation. It wasn’t enough to be simply protected under the shield of a sovereign, Rousseau believed that to elevate ourselves out of the state of nature, man must particip ate in the process of being the sovereign that provided the protection. The differences between Rousseau’s theories and those of the liberals of his time, begin with different interpretations of the state of nature. Thomas Hobbes described the state of nature as an unsafe place, where the threat of harm to one’s property was always present. He felt that man could have no liberty in such a setting, as fear of persecution and enslavement would control his every action. From this dismal setting, Hobbes proposed that man would necessarily rise and enter into a social contract. By submitting himself to the power of a sovereign, man would be protected by that same power, thereby gaining his liberty. Rousseau’s version of the state of nature differs greatly. He makes no mention of the constant fear which Hobbes believed would control man’s life in the state of nature, rather he describes the setting as pleasant and peaceful. He described the people in this primi tive state as living free, healthy, honest and happy lives, and felt that man was timid, and would always avoid conflict, rather than seek it out. Building from this favorable description of the state of nature, why would man want to enter into a social contract of any kind? If Rousseau was so fond of the state of nature, why would he be advocating any form of social organization? The answer is two fold. Firstly, Rousseau recognized that 18th century Europe was indeed very civilized, and that it would be impossible for man to shake off these chains and return to a state of nature.

About Me

My culture, Hinduism, and race, Indian, have been the most influential characteristics in my life. These two characteristics combined also influence my other characteristics such as my age and sex. In America, my age restricts me from doing many things; but coming from a Hindu background brings me many more responsibilities along with my age. My sex prohibits me from achieving many life goals that other people would have no problem achieving. My ethnicity and culture have had a very big impact on my social life. Learning that I was different from others was an experience that I will remember for the rest of my life. I learned about one of my dominant characteristics in the second grade. One day in class, Steven Vogel cut out little red dots for me because I did not already have one on my forehead. He also howled like an American Indian and did a rain dance for me. That day, I realized that I was different and I would have to live with it for the rest of my life. I lived in a southern town of Florida near the border of Alabama where many people were not open to other races; so I would have to get used to the taunting. At that time, I realized that I am Indian. Growing up, everyone wants to be in the in-group. Being an Indian Hindu girl, I was told not to go out. I was not allowed to go to football games, school dances, or any other after-school functions. No matter how much we want to be in the popular group in high school, most Indian children belong in the group between the in-group and the nerds. Hindu parents usually do not let their children go out because they believe their children will be corrupted. For example, I really wanted to go to my senior prom, but I was not allowed to. I was not even allowed to get a job like a normal teenager. This summer I asked my parents if I could so that I could save up for college. My father did not let me get a job because I had to stay home to learn how to cook. Females have very little advantages in my culture. We are not allowed to be too educated. If a woman is too educated, she is basically considered to be no good, modern, too independent and an instigator of family problems after marriage. The belief that girls should not be allowed as much freedom and independence as men hinders other women, from achieving many of our life goals and me. With age I have many responsibilities and restrictions. Most of my restrictions come from living in America. I am not yet allowed to vote. I am not given many job opportunities: I went to the mall a week ago to find a job but most of the stores require their employees to be eighteen. Another restriction that my ethnicity, along with age and sex, brings is marriage. A good Indian girl is engaged by the age of twenty-one or twenty-two. I am only seventeen years old, but I am expected to know how to cook and clean because this is the prime age when the adult matchmakers observe me. I expect my life in the future to include being a housewife. I approve of the concept of housewives, but I would like to be more educated. The times have slowly been changing. I am a first generation Indian-American and I have more privileges than my parents did. Because of the changing times, I may be able to fulfill my dreams of becoming a doctor. The typical Indian, Hindu family instills the importance of respect and morals into their children. I have learned to appreciate all of the values that my parents have taught me while growing up. This is a big privilege because when I look out in the world, I see families who teach their children to hate or do not teach their children the significance of respect. I was taught also to especially respect my teachers. Many people, however, do not have that same respect. I am proud that I have had the chance to learn and grow up with the values and principles that are taught by Hinduism.

Gay Marriage †persuasive essa Essay

Everyone dreams of one day becoming married and having a family, and most of the time this dream is fulfilled, that is, if they are straight. As each year passes by, there seems to be an increasing number of gay couples that aspire to become married. Even though gay marriage is becoming an extremely popular topic, people begin to realize that it does either one of two things (unless they are apathetic on the issue); gay marriage puts a strain on the outlook of society or it opens up many opportunities for the gay couples themselves. Bishops and other religious figures of the church feel that gay marriage is appalling, and should be abolished from society. The article mentioned in the National Catholic Reporter, â€Å"Bishops Warn of Dangers to Marriage,† it is revealed that bishops believe same-sex marriage is â€Å"one of the most troubling developments in contemporary culture. † (Roberts 2). According to text, the first command given to Adam and Eve was â€Å"be fertile and multiply† (National Catholic Reporter). The culture of America is perceived to be a family consisting of one mother, one father, and however many kids are desired; however, if same-sex marriage were to be allowed, it would diminish all natural aspects of our culture. Bishops of the Church believe that it is â€Å"in the offspring† where â€Å"married love finds its crowning glory† (Roberts 2). To reiterate into other words, the greatest achievement of marriage is found in the child created by that man and woman. Though one may not believe in Christ or anything to do with religion, the Church is against gay marriage because they believe that men and women were created to produce fertile offspring, a task impossible for gay couples. Most people against gay marriage agree that it can nit and should not be permitted because the female necessitates a dominant male figure to protect her. In the Weekly Standard, â€Å"The Worst Thing About Gay Marriage,† teaches us that â€Å"marriage is a part of a kinship system† and kinship depends on the â€Å"protection, organization, and often exploitation of female sexuality vis-i -vis male† (Schulman 3). Women and children have suffered and will continue to suffer from being over-protected and controlled, but the consequence of under-protection and indifference will be immeasurably worse (Schulman 4). It is understandable that over-protected women feel effected by the matter, but at least they are guaranteed someone to be there when in danger, while on the other hand, under-protected women are far more vulnerable. We realize that marriage is above all, â€Å"concerned with female sexuality† and that kinship depends on the protection of women from â€Å"rape, degradation, and concubinage† (Schulman 2). This is why marriage between and man and woman has been necessary in virtually every society ever known (Schulman 2). In other words, it is a priority to attain a male-female relationship in order to create the safest possible environment for the female. Same-sex marriage cannot offer the appropriate assurance for the female’s safety due to the lack of a male figure designed to protect. Often, marriage leads to the desire for kids, and adoption is the only way that desire can be fulfilled for homosexual couples, which can tremendously affect the child’s path in being raised as a normal kid. Psychological Reports, as mentioned in Paul Cameron and Ellen C. Perrin’s â€Å"Insight on the News,† tested 52 families and ninety-two percent of the children in those families â€Å"mentioned one or more ‘problems'† which included â€Å"hyper sexuality, instability, molestation, and domestic violence† (Cameron and Perrin 2). A great majority of kids growing up in a home with homosexual parents find it to do so because they are lacking either a mother or a father, who are both vital participants in childhood. On one Insight on the News interview, a nine year old girl growing up with gay parents reveals her feelings of discomfort at home and how â€Å"all of a sudden [she] felt like a different person because [her] mom was a lesbian† (Cameron and Perrin 2). Every marriage between a man and a woman is capable of giving any child that they create or adopt a mother and a father, which is the opposite for gay couples (Gallagher 109). Gay adoption can be a negative part of a child’s life because it is usually found to be hard on the child growing up, due to the fact that they lack either a mother or father figure. While a high number of individuals are against gay marriage, there are also the ones who believe everyone should be granted equal rights. America has always been set on the idea of equality for all because â€Å"our fathers brought forth this continent, a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all mean are created equal† (Lincoln). Sadly this nation has taken a long time to live up to that promise of equality (Olson 2). Society encourages marriage because of the commitment not only to each other but also to their families which creates a union between the two; however, society doesn’t seem to accept this same idea for homosexuals. If same-sex marriage were to be legalized, it would be†recognition of basic American principles† as it would â€Å"represent our nation’s commitment to equal rights† (Olson 2). Historical figures from America’s history to now have always promised equal rights for everyone, yet hays seem to continue to be discriminated against. The basis of America has always been freedom and equality for all, discarding all of homosexuals who are granted limited marriage rights. As mentioned earlier, marriage naturally leads to the aspiration for having children, and adoption is the only way for homosexual couples to do so, which in the end is a positive side of gay marriage because it opens up the doors for a child in need of a loving home. As stated in The First Post, there are never enough parents to adopt out all of the children in foster care homes, so â€Å"whether the family is gay or straight† it is usually â€Å"better than the foster-care system† (1). Gay adoption can open up many opportunities for the children trapped in the foster-care system because they will be showed the love and other vital aspects of childhood that would never be expressed in foster-care. A new twenty five year study, as mentioned in the Atlanta Journal Constitution, shows that children of gay parents showed higher ratings than their peers in â€Å"social, academic, and overall competence† and â€Å"lower in aggressive behavior† (Manford and Chrisler 1). Children of gay parents are overall better off than children with heterosexual divorced parents because they have two full-time parental figures that are always there for them (Manford and Chrisler 1). Children of gay parents demonstrate a more confident statue mainly because they are supported by two parents, whereas an increasing majority of children have divorced parents. A positive idea of gay marriage is gay adoption because it creates a positive outlook for kids who thought they would never have a chance in the foster-care system. Many people against gay marriage believe that it ruins the prosperity of heterosexual marriage, when in reality they just search for any possible reason to make gay marriage appear as an unspeakable issue. In his editorial found on About. com, Tom Head explains that in the countries that have legalized same-sex marriage, the rate of heterosexual marriage has either â€Å"gone up, remained stable, or declined consistent with other countries in the region that do not recognize same-sex marriage† (Head 1). In other words, gay marriage has absolutely no affect on heterosexual marriage as shown in the statistics of Tom Head’s editorial, because the rates of heterosexual marriages stay the same as they would if gay couples didn’t exist. Found on the Daily Paul Liberty Forum, Bruce Hausknecht admits that â€Å"there is no aspect of family life† that is impacted by a homosexual agenda that is â€Å"fundamentally at odds with the biblical view of marriage and sexuality† (Hausknecht 1). To recap, there is no family containing heterosexual parents that is impacted by the views of gay marriage; gay marriage isn’t harming anyone. An optimistic outlook on gay marriage is the idea of it harming nobody, especially heterosexual marriages, which is a main target in trying to destroy gay marriage. Gay marriage has always been and will continue to be a highly controversial issue among the believers and non-believers. There will always be those people who oppose gay marriage, accepting that male-female marriage was generated to produce fertile offspring. There will also be those who want equality for all. These two beliefs are the basis of the controversy of the issue, and it will continue to be until gay marriage is accepted in society.